Abstract. Two-way group voice communications, otherwise known as teleconferencing are common in commercial and defense networks. One of the main features of military teleconferences is the need to provide means to enforce the Multilevel Security (MLS) model. In this paper we propose an architecture and protocols facilitating MLS conferences over Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). We develop protocols to establish secure telephone conferencing at a specific security level, add and drop conference participants, change the security level of an ongoing conference, and tear down a conference. These protocols enforce MLS requirements and prevent against eavesdropping. Our solution is based on encryption methods used for user and telephone authentication and message encryption, and trusted authentication centers and certificate authorities. We provide an initial estimate of signaling delays of our protocols incurred due to the enforcement of the MLS requirements.
Introduction
The need to provide secure communication via public telephone systems has resulted in custom designed and dedicated devices, like the secure telephone unit third generation (STU-III) [3] and TeleVPN [2] . While these methods provide some level of confidentiality, they require extensive setup procedures and dedicated hardware or do not require telephone device authentication. Our aim is to enable current telephone technologies to provide voice privacy without the extensive setup and maintenance requirements of the current systems.
Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN [13] -a circuit switched network with almost zero down time and acceptable quality audio signals -use Signaling System 7 (SS7) [4, 5, 9, 7, 8, 6, 11] as its signaling network to set up, configure, maintain, and tear down voice circuits that are used to transmit continuous voice streams. Moreover, increasingly popular mobile telephones can also depend on SS7. However, SS7 provides limited security to its signaling and voice networks, as shown by Lorencz et al. [10] . Recognizing these limitations, Sharif et al. [12] present protocols to ensure voice confidentiality over PSTN using the Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model. Their solution uses public and secret key encryption methods to authenticate the users and telephone devices, and to provide encrypted end-to-end communication. They show that authentication delays are within acceptable range for PSTN. Youn et al. [14] extend the protocols of Sharif et al. to DAC based secure teleconferences over PSTN. That is, participation in a conference is decided on the identity of the user (telephone device). However, their methods do not satisfy the security needs of military conferences. In this paper, we extend both these works to MLS based teleconferencing. We adopt the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) [1] access control model. BLP policies are expressed via security classification labels, assigned to subjects (i.e., active computer system entities) and to objects (i.e., passive resources). Classification labels form a lattice with a dominance relation among the labels. BLP controls read and write operations on the objects based on the classification labels of the requested data objects and the clearance of the subject requesting the operation. For example, BLP ensures that a subject can read an object only if the subject's clearance dominates the object's classification (simple-security property) and that a subject can write an object only if the object's classification dominates the subject's clearance (*-property). Trusted subjects are permitted to bypass the *-property of the BLP. The two axioms of BLP ensure confidentiality by permitting information flow from a dominated security class to a dominating security class but not in the other direction. While MLS is considered too restrictive for general purpose applications, it is required in the military domain.
In this paper we propose an MLS teleconference security model and provide a set of protocols to establish and maintain an MLS teleconference at a specified security level. In our model, a user (conference participant) and his/her telephone device together are considered as the subject; the conference (i.e., its content) is considered as the object. The user who initiates the conference, called call controller, requests the join (add) of a user/telephone to an active conference. However, the actual "adding" of a user/telephone must be permitted by a referential monitor that enforces the simple security property of BLP. That is, a user/telephone is permitted to join a conference only if the security classification of the conference is dominated by the greatest lower bound of the security clearances of the user and the telephone device. The human users are trusted not to violate the *-property, i.e., a user is trusted not to reveal any information that is classified higher than the level of the conference. Call controllers are also trusted (trusted subject) to lower the security clearance of an ongoing conference. To ensure that telephone devices cannot leak confidential information, they are cleared based on their encryption capabilities and verified hardware. We develop a set of protocols to ensure that the conference content is protected from unauthorized disclosure at any time. We also perform analysis of the conference dynamics and the necessary security evaluations to guarantee message confidentiality. Our aim is to limit the necessary delays incurred by the authentication, security checking, and the conference key refreshment. We give an analysis of the incurred delays for our secure teleconference.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our security architecture and the MLS teleconferencing model. In Section 3 we present descriptions of our protocols and the corresponding security requirements. Section 4 contains the delay calculation. Finally, we conclude and recommend future research directions in Section 5. We included sample protocols in Appendix A and the break down of the delay calculation in Appendix B.
Security Model
The main aim of our research is to build on top of the existing communication infra-structure. Our protocols to set up, maintain, and tear down secure teleconferences use libraries on the Signaling System 7 (SS7) protocol stack. MLS teleconferencing uses secure bridges [12, 14] .
Secure Teleconferencing Architecture
We distinguish between a single master-secure bridge (MSB) and slave-secure bridges (SB). MSB has all the capabilities needed for teleconferencing and to enforce MLS requirements. MSB connects to the call-master, i.e., the participant who is initiating the conference. Slave-secure bridges (SB), connecting the conference participants, performs participant and telephone authentication. Each secure bridge is associated with an 1) Authentication Center (AC) to authenticate users and telephones, and to manage secret keys, and a 2) Certificate Authority (CA) to manage digital certificates and generate public/private key pairs. Our model requires that each telephone has cryptographic capabilities using symmetric and public keys. Telephones (and their corresponding secure bridges) are trusted based on these cryptographic capabilities as well as hardware verification of the physical device.
Additional PSTN components, like the Service Switching Points (SSP), Service Control Points (SCP), and Signal Control Point, together with the secure bridges form the secure teleconferencing architecture [14] . Our protocols use the Digital Subscriber Signaling System no 1 (DSS1) to communicate between the telephones and the local SSPs. ISDN user part (ISUP) is used for communication between SSPs and Transaction capabilities Library (TCAP) as well as for transactions between SSPs, ACs, CAs, and Line Information Translation Database (LIDBs ).
Security Model
Our goal is to protect the confidentiality of the telephone conversation from unauthorized disclosure. Note, that the problem of hiding the existence of an unauthorized conference is outside of the scope of this paper. We propose methods to apply the BLP security model to teleconferencing. The subject of our model is the telephone device and the human user (conference initiator and participants) using the telephone. Telephones are authenticated based on the telephone line numbers (TLN), telephone device numbers (TDN), and the private keys assigned to them. A security clearance label is assigned for each telephone, based on its encryption capabilities, verification of hardware components (e.g., trusted hardware and reliability), and physical security. Telephone clearances are considered relatively static. Increasing or decreasing a telephone's clearance level requires technical modifications, like encryption updates. We assume that users are aware of the clearance of the telephone devices.
User authentication is performed by a claimed user identity and the corresponding password. Each user with maximum security clearance λ is associated with a set of passwords, where each password λ in the set corresponds to a specific security level and λ ≥ λ . To prevent the exposure of a higher security password on a lower security telephone device, we require that each user is authenticated with the password that is assigned to him/her for the level of the telephone device. For example, a user U with Top-Secret (TS) security clearance has different passwords for Unclassified, Secret, and Top-Secret levels. When U uses a telephone with Secret clearance, the user is authenticated based on his/her Secret level password. Note, that different approaches could be used to limit exposure of user passwords on telephones. For example, users may be restricted to use telephone devices only if the clearance level of the device dominates the clearance level of the user. Finding the optimal approach is outside of our current research and is dependent on the application area, the number of levels, and the available hardware resources.
A secure bridge, serving a telephone with clearance λ, stores the appropriate (user-id, password) pairs for all levels λ , where λ ≥ λ . For each call activation by a user U i , using the telephone T i , the permitted security clearance is calculated as the greatest lower bound of [ λ(U i ), λ(T i )], where λ(U i ) and λ(T i ) are the clearances of user U i and device T i , respectively.
The protection object is the content of the telephone conference. Each conference is initiated at a specified security level. Conference classification levels may increase and decrease along the dominance relation of the security lattice. We require that a user/telephone pair is permitted to initiate or join a conference only if the greatest lower bound of their joint security clearance dominates the security classification of the conference. This paper studies the conference dynamics, including initiating the conference, adding and dropping participants, changing security classification of an ongoing conference, and changing the call controller of an ongoing conference. Our security requirement is that an unauthorized user should not be able to disclose the conference content. That is, unauthorized users should not be permitted to become participants of a conference or gain access to the secret key used to encrypt the content of the conference. The later requirement protects against passive eavesdropping. Our security requirements are supported by the properties of existing secret and public key encryption methods and by safeguarding the encryption/decryption keys. In addition to the security requirement we want to limit the number of authentication procedures and key updates that cause delays in the teleconferencing.
Protocols
We developed eight protocols to support secure telephone conferencing: 1) Establish a conference, 2) Add a new conferee by the call controller, 3) Add a new conferee by his/her own request, 4) Drop a conferee by the call controller, 5) Drop a conferee by his/her own choosing (hang up), 6) Change the classification of an ongoing conference 7) Call teardown by the call controller hanging up, and 8) Call teardown when the last slave conferee hangs up. Due to the space restrictions of the paper we only present some of our protocols.
Protocol 1 -Teleconference Call Setup Process
The teleconference call setup process has five phases: 1) Telephone authentication, 2) User authentication, 3) Cross certification of the MSB, 4) Remote telephone authentication, 5) Remote user authentication, 6) Cross certification of the SSBs, and 7) Key distribution. Figure 1 
, where R * 0 is a nonce generated by AC that will be embedded in the message exchanged between call master and M SB during the teleconference session, and t 1 is a timestamp. Both the random number and the timestamp are meant to prevent the replay attack. An IVR message solicits the user to dial her user ID. 
Protocol 2 -Add a Participant to an Ongoing Conference
After the conference is set up, new participants U x may join the ongoing conference. U 0 (call controller) places the teleconference on hold by pressing the HOLD button. The other conferees are still able to talk while the conference is on hold. U 0 initiates the new participant by dialing the U x 's telephone number. The minimal requirement after successful authentication of T x and U x is that
Based on the conference dynamics, the encryption key used for the conference may or may not need to be updated (see Section 3.4).
Protocol 3 -Drop a Participant from an Ongoing Conference
Conference participants may be dropped from an active conference voluntarily (conferee hangs up) or non-voluntarily (call controller drops the user to maintain the MLS requirements). For example, a user with Secret clearance may decide to discontinue participation in a Secret conference. The same user may rejoin the conference at a later time. On the other hand, a user with Secret clearance is "forced" to be dropped from a conference when the conference classification is increased from Secret to Top-Secret. The MSB is responsible for enforcing the drop of the participants, reallocating the system resources, and initiating a new encryption key if a forced drop occurred.
Protocol 4 -Change the Security Classification of an Ongoing Conference
The security classification of an ongoing conference may be changed during the conference. For example, after discussing a Top-Secret topic, the security classification of the conference may be decreased to Secret to allow participation of Secret users. Any change in the conference classification may have an effect on the 1) minimum clearance requirement of the call controller, 2) new clearance requirements of the participants of the ongoing conference, 3) dropping conference participants, and 4) need of new encryption key. Figure 2 shows the message transfer to change the conference classification.
To change the security classification of an ongoing conference to a new classification, the call controller U 0 must be cleared to the new classification. That is, if λ(conf 0 ) denotes the security classification of the ongoing conference, and λ(conf new ) denotes the requested security classification, then the new level is permitted only if λ(U 0 ) ≥ λ(conf new ). Moreover, to decrease the classification of a conference, the call controller must be trusted. If λ(U i ) ≥ λ(conf new ) is not true for all participants U i then U i must be dropped and a new message encryption key must be distributed among the remaining participants. Also, if the conference classification is decreased and a new user U i is added such that λ(conf 0 ) > λ(U i ) ≥ λ(conf new ) then a new message encryption key must be distributed among the participants. Users U x who do not have
Fig. 2. Changing an ongoing conference classification
We consider the following three scenarios: decrease conference classification, increase conference classification, and change the classification to an incomparable level. Table 1 show our security analysis for these scenarios from the perspectives of security requirements for the call controller, active participants, new participants, and the need of new key generation.
Note, that any change in the conference classification can be modeled as a series of single steps in the security lattice. That is, a change from label λ 1 to λ k is 
Performance Analysis
We compute the delays of our protocol, using standard telecommunication connections delays [16, 17, 18] , published encryption/decryption delays for text [3] , and the switch response time delays. Table 2 in Appendix B summarizes our findings. The encryption and decryption time for RSA encryption and decryption is considered to be 12ms, (we do not consider the possibility of a small public key, therefore the encryption and decryption time is about the same). Table 3 in Appendix B shows the network delays corresponding to our protocols. The delays corresponding to the user interaction (like the time before an user answer the phone, the time necessary for a user to enter the password, or playing messages) are hard to measure and are user dependent, therefore are not considered here. The user interaction delay may take considerable time, but it is unavoidable and also part of traditional (un-secure) teleconferencing. The worst case calculation, given in Table 3 , shows that teleconference setup delay is slightly less than 20 seconds under the assumption that all slave conferees are authenticated simultaneously (i.e., parallel authentication). Adding a user delay is about 11 seconds. Dropping a user and changing the conference classification create small (2-3 seconds) delays.
Conclusions
In this paper we present an architecture and protocols to facilitate multilevel secure teleconferences over Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Our goal is to protect conversation confidentiality. Our protocols enable to establish secure telephone conferencing at a specific security level, add and drop conference participants, change the security level of an active conference, and tear down a conference. The protocols protect against eavesdropping and unauthorized participation in a MLS conference. MLS requirements are enforced by safeguarding the message encryption key of the conference. We also provide an initial estimates of delays incurred during setup (20 seconds) and adding a user (11 seconds). The authors are not aware of any published acceptance delay range for automated teleconferencing. Based on our experiences using such services (e.g., observed delays of several minutes for conference set up) indicates that the delays, incurred by our protocols, are within the acceptable range. Nevertheless, for future references, we are planning to request evaluation of our protocols by vendors and developers. For future work we are planning to simulate our protocols to generate realistic measurements over the incurred delays. Furthermore, we are investigating methods to include a protocol for negotiating encryption algorithms, keys, and configurations specifications between the participants. be embedded in the message exchanged between call master and MSB during the teleconference session, and t1 is a timestamp. Both the random number and the timestamp are meant to prevent the replay attack. An IVR message solicits the user to dial her user ID. 
B. Conference Classification and the Telephone Line Numbers
1. The call master dials the number of the nc conferees, one by one (nc is a number between 1 and 30). We suppose that only n conferees (n = nc) succeed in connecting to the conference. The other (nc − n) conferees do not connect or have authentication failure. The number of conferencing sub-+(n + 8)a0
scribers is n
